Thailands junger Premier konnte den Aufstand der roten Opposition, die bereits den Asean-Gipfel gesprengt hatte, nur durch den Einsatz von Militär und Erklärung des Ausnahmezustandes stoppen, vorerst. Denn hinter dem Machtkampf stehen die beiden Hälften der thailändischen Gesellschaft, die den Machtkampf vorerst offen halten, urteilt Stratfor.
Natürlich gehe der aktuelle Konflikt auf die Rolle Thaksins zurück, des gestürzten Premiers und Tycoons, der aus dem Exil noch immer die Strippen zieht, argumentiert Stratfor in einer aktuellen Studie. Doch die Wurzeln des Konfliktes seien viel tiefer, und seien letztlich durch die geografische Lage des Landes bestimmt:
"Social and political unrest is woven through Thailand's political culture - the country has had 19 coups and numerous attempted coups since its transformation to a constitutional monarchy in 1932. The cyclical instability arises from geopolitical factors that historically have determined Thailand's behavior and will continue to do so. Geopolitics is rooted in geography. Thailand forms the heart of the jungle-covered Southeast Asian peninsula, wedged between Myanmar to the west, Laos and Cambodia to the east, and Malaysia to the south. Most versions of Thai history consider the ethnic Thai people to have been late-comers to the region; harried successively by Chinese and Mongol armies from the north, the Thai were forced to carve out their plot between the Burmese and Khmer empires, and to vie with Malay and Chinese traders."
Daher musste Thailand immer seine Grenzen in alle Richtung verteidigen und seine eigenen Randregionen unter Kontrolle halten - was nicht gerade einfach war und ist:
"On the eastern Khorat Plateau, Bangkok's hold was always challenged by Cambodian and Vietnamese influence. In the south, the predominantly Muslim inhabitants periodically have resisted Bangkok's authority; a Muslim insurgency rages in the south today. But the most difficult region for Bangkok to rein in was the north, with its capital Chiang Mai. Chiang Mai and Siam were ancient enemies, and Siam did not win full administrative control over the city until the late 1800s. The northern hills not only provided business opportunities such as logging, but also cover for those rebelling against the central power, including a communist insurgency and a separatist movement by ethnic minorities. Significantly, the mountains also enabled a massive and lucrative opium trade that generated organized criminal networks and corruption, which pervaded provincial governments, the business elite and even the national military."
Und gerade vor diesem Hintergrund müsse der aktuelle Konflikt verstanden werden:
"The current Democrat-led government is firmly rooted in Bangkok. The military, monarchy, civil bureaucracy and urban middle class are for the most part aligned with the government. They claim to be devoted to traditional Thai values of nation, religion and monarchy and to revere King Bhumibol Adulyadej. (...)The movement now in opposition to the government is rooted in the north and northeast. The majority of the population and a wealthy network of provincial big business and agriculture based in these regions support the pro-rural policies of Thaksin, who is a native son of Chiang Mai. Thaksin's side is associated with entrepreneurs and international capitalist commerce, which is anathema to the military and monarchy. Thaksin is also said to have much influence among the national police force, since he served as a policeman.
Daher stelle sich der Machtkampf als Streit zwischen der Hauptstadt Bangkok und den Provinzen dar, zwischen Stadt und Land. Früher habe das Militär im Verbund mit der Monarchie für einen Interessensausgleich gesorgt. Doch inzwischen gebe es Spannungen im Militär und zwischen dem Militär und der Polizei - was immer wieder zu Putschen geführt habe. Aktuell könnten die Sicherheitskräfte zwar für Stabilität sorgen - aber nur temporär:
"Still, these are passing causes of instability, which itself will remain an essential fact of Thailand's geopolitics."
